ALL U ANCAPS SAY THEREs NO SUCH THING AS MARKET FAILURE
So why am I still mortal???
save me free market
Correction: all those an caps who read Rothbard.
Honestly, Rothbard’s argument that market failure cannot exist by definition is about as convincing as some Marxists who argue that capitalists exploit workers by definition.
Although the arguments are logically true, they do not say anything about the world.
Apparently it’s not socially acceptable for a man to invite another man out just for coffee or to go out for a meal, in case it’s perceived as a date. Like it’s fine if you wanna go to the pub and drink beer and have a chat but make it non-alcoholic and suddenly you’re not straight anymore? You can go to the cinema together but ONLY if it’s an action movie. You guys can’t even just go shopping with each other. Oh masculinity, so fragile, so strange.
I’ve been on such a “Man date” before and the idea I might be preceived as homosexual never even crossed my mind
Side note: I typed homosexual incorrectly and it got auto corrected to “him oscillator” which might not be a completely wrong description.
How is it possible to have utility maximizing rationality and economic growth at the same time? It would seem to me that growth is an ex post indicator in the current period that the economy was not optimized in previous periods. The empirical fact of almost always positive economic growth would seem to prove that humans on a whole have never optimized anything which is really a jab at the assumption of human rationality.
Economists usually explain away this seeming paradox by saying that growth is caused by exogenous shocks. This seems unsatisfactory to me. In particular, the exogenous shock explanation begs the question of why empirically, these exogenous shocks are on average, disproportionately positive. It seems to me that the theory is lacking here.
Right now, the most beautiful sentence in the English language to me is “This completes the proof.”
Trying to perform a single variable optimization problem using a Lagrangian.
In my defense, there was a condition attached to the optimization problem that my mind immediately read as a constraint.
Abstract: Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity—particularly diversity of viewpoints—for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: 1) Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years; 2) This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike; 3) Increased political diversity would improve social psychological science by reducing the impact of bias mechanisms such as confirmation bias, and by empowering dissenting minorities to improve the quality of the majority’s thinking; and 4) The underrepresentation of nonliberals in social psychology is most likely due to a combination of self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination. We close with recommendations for increasing political diversity in social psychology.
When I first heard that Bryan Caplan rejected the notion of Knightian uncertainty as incoherent, I was a bit confused. Sure he could talk about how the existence of uncertainty makes many economic problems unsolvable in any objective sense, but surely, that doesn’t make it incoherent. However, after listening to his views on this, it’s actually quite reasonable (although really, it doesn’t seem like he’s really critiquing Knightian uncertainty at all). His critique was about the “radical subjectivism” of Lachman or Shackle (or even Kirzner). Even if actors don’t literally have some probability distribution in their mind, they can be postulated to act as if they do. It’s really the same way that even though actors don’t literally have utility functions that they are maximizing, in a formal model, they can be thought of as utility maximizers (as long as everyone understands that the model is an idealized abstraction).
By contrast, the idea that can people literally have no idea is at the very least, empirically unlikely.
Who tagged me: jenlog
Replace with your own answers and then tag 10 people
allow me to step it up a notch:
"Hi there, human"
Accidentally found ordungsokonomik on youtube…whoops